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Climate change has caused devastating impacts throughout the world.  The 
regions that are most vulnerable to these impacts are the Arctic and low-lying 
island nations.  Low-lying nations potentially face more difficulties than 
communities and states in the Arctic, however.  These island nations must not 
only absorb and respond to climate change impacts, but they also face potential 
loss of sovereignty because relocation to a foreign country will likely be 
necessary in the near future for many of them.1  Because devastating physical, 
economic, and cultural impacts threaten to displace populations in island 
nations, immediate action is necessary from the international community to 
assist these nations in adapting to these impacts and to continue to thrive 
culturally and politically. 
Professor Maxine Burkett is one of the leading scholars in the world on 
climate justice, and her work has spearheaded scholarship involving the rights 
of island nations in addressing climate change impacts.2  Climate justice can be 
divided into (1) compensation and liability and (2) sovereignty and relocation.  
Professor Burkett’s article evaluated in this comment addresses the former 
category.3  Her article proposes a Small Island Compensation and Rehabilitation 
Commission (CRC) that would provide compensation for climate loss and 
damage for slow-onset loss caused by climate change.4 
 
1. The internal displacement that Arctic indigenous communities face is equally tragic and demands 
urgent domestic attention. See generally Randall S. Abate, Corporate Responsibility and Climate 
Justice: A Proposal for a Polluter-Financed Relocation Fund for Federally Recognized Tribes 
Imperiled by Climate Change, 25 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 10 (2013). 
2. From 2009 to 2012, Professor Burkett served as the inaugural Director of the Center for Island 
Climate Adaptation and Policy (ICAP) at the University of Hawai‘i William S. Richardson School 
of Law. As the Director of ICAP, she led projects to address climate change law, policy, and 
planning for island communities in Hawai‘i, the Pacific region, and beyond. In 2010, she served as 
the Wayne Morse Chair of Law and Politics at the Wayne Morse Center, University of Oregon, for 
the Center’s “Climate Ethics and Climate Equity” theme of inquiry. Professor Burkett has written 
extensively on climate justice and island adaptation issues. For a sampling of this scholarship, see 
generally Maxine A. Burkett, A Justice Paradox: On Climate Change, Small Island Developing 
States, and the Quest for Effective Legal Remedy, 35 U. HAW. L. REV. 633 (2013); Maxine A. 
Burkett, Duty and Breach in an Era of Uncertainty: Local Government Liability for Failure to 
Adapt to Climate Change, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 775 (2013); Maxine A. Burkett, Litigating 
Climate Change Adaptation: Theory, Practice, and Corrective (Climate) Justice, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. 
11144 (2012); Maxine A. Burkett, Climate Justice and the Elusive Climate Tort, 121 YALE L.J. 
ONLINE 115 (2011); Maxine A. Burkett, Climate Reparations, 10 MELB. J. INT’L L. 509 (2009); 
Maxine A. Burkett, Just Solutions to Climate Change: A Climate Justice Proposal for a Domestic 
Clean Development Mechanism, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 169 (2008). 
3. Professor Burkett has also examined the sovereignty and relocation aspects of climate justice.  
See, e.g., Maxine A. Burkett, The Nation Ex-Situ, in THREATENED ISLAND NATIONS: LEGAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF RISING SEAS AND A CHANGING CLIMATE 89 (Michael B. Gerrard & Gregory E. 
Wannier eds., 2015). 
4. See generally Maxine A. Burkett, Rehabilitation: A Proposal for a Climate Compensation 
Mechanism for Small Island States, 13 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 81 (2015). 
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Professor Burkett’s article is a timely, ambitious, and significant contribution 
to the literature on climate change compensation and liability.  In the most 
recent Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United National Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Warsaw, Poland in November 
2013, a Climate Loss and Damage Mechanism was drafted.5  Although an 
important step in the right direction, this mechanism is a largely aspirational, 
mere first step toward providing meaningful climate justice to island nations.  
Professor Burkett’s article seeks to accelerate the process of providing relief for 
slow-onset climate loss and damage for island nations.  
With full appreciation for Professor Burkett’s thoughtful and ambitious 
undertaking in proposing the CRC for small island nations in her article, this 
comment addresses some concerns about her approach.  The comment proceeds 
from a simple thesis: climate adaptation measures are best applied in the 
contexts of “prevention” and “cure.”  First, climate adaptation funding and 
implementation makes most sense when addressed as a proactive measure to 
enhance a country’s ability to respond to and absorb climate change impacts.  
Second, climate change adaptation responses should again be engaged at the 
back end of the process, when nations or communities within them are forcibly 
displaced from their homelands by rising sea levels or other extreme climate 
change-related events.  The middle ground between these two ends of the 
spectrum is where Professor Burkett focuses her analysis, and it is in this 
context where several conceptual and logistical challenges arise.   
The starting premise of Professor Burkett’s article is uncontroversial.  The 
Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) nations are on the “front lines” of 
climate change impacts.  They will be among the first to experience extreme 
disruption from climate change impacts, and they are among the least 
equipped—financially and technologically—to adapt to these changes.  
Therefore, AOSIS nations need climate adaptation assistance from the 
international community to ensure their continued survival as nations and 
peoples. 
 
5. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conf. of the Parties, 19th Sess., Nov. 11–22, 
2013, Draft Decision -/CP.19, Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated 
with Climate Change Impacts, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2013/L.15 (Nov. 22, 2013), available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/warsaw_nov_2013/in-session/application/pdf/fccc.cp.2013.l.15.pdf. 
For a helpful background discussion of the UNFCCC foundation for a loss and damage 
mechanism, see Ilona Millar et al., Making Good the Loss: An Assessment of the Loss and Damage 
Mechanism under the UNFCCC Process, in THREATENED ISLAND NATIONS: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 
OF RISING SEAS AND A CHANGING CLIMATE 433 (Michael B. Gerrard & Gregory E. Wannier eds., 
2013). 
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The first obstacle to Professor Burkett’s approach concerns the scope of 
coverage.  While it is true that many of the smaller AOSIS nations are in 
imminent peril of disappearing within the next few decades and would benefit 
greatly from the remedies that the CRC could offer, many other climate justice 
communities throughout the world face similar perils.  Therefore, there would 
be a problem of inequitable scope in implementing Professor Burkett’s CRC 
funding mechanism because it would be limited to AOSIS nations, yet other 
climate justice communities, such as the least developed nations in Africa and 
indigenous communities in the Arctic, would be ineligible for CRC funding 
despite their comparable need for assistance. 
The logistics of climate adaptation are complex and have left gaps in other 
contexts as well.  For example, under the Green Climate Fund,6 developed 
nations are committed to provide funding for a mechanism to support mitigation 
and adaptation measures in developing countries.  Yet, indigenous communities 
in the Arctic may not receive assistance from this fund because only developing 
nations are eligible for Green Climate Fund assistance.  Moreover, Arctic 
indigenous communities in the U.S. are not eligible to receive relocation 
assistance until after disaster strikes, and only for a limited number of 
enumerated natural disasters.  Slow-onset climate change impacts, such as 
coastal erosion, are not among the enumerated natural disasters.  Worse still, 
even if such communities were eligible for FEMA assistance, such assistance 
only supports temporary, rather than permanent, relocation costs.7 
Given these inequalities among similarly situated climate-vulnerable 
populations, the focus should first be on “prevention” in addressing climate 
adaptation.  This approach should be implemented at the international and 
domestic levels.  At the international level, developed nations should contribute 
to funds like the Green Climate Fund to assist developing nations with 
adaptation measures before climate change-related disaster strikes.  Similarly, 
in developed nations, there should be domestic climate adaptation funds to 
assist vulnerable populations like the indigenous communities in the Arctic, the 
United States, and Canada.   
This proactive “prevention” assistance for climate adaptation is an important 
first step, but it is not enough by itself.  Climate change impacts will continue to 
 
6. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Cancun, Mex., Nov. 29–Dec. 10, 2009, Decision 
1/CP.16, The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-
term Cooperative Action under the Convention, ¶ 102, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 
2011), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/ 07a01.pdf#page=17 
(establishing the Green Climate Fund). 
7. See generally Abate, supra note 1. 
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progress rapidly, and many of these vulnerable communities and nations will 
soon need assistance in the form of a “cure”—financial and technological 
assistance to secure a new place to call home.  Such relocation may take two 
forms.  First, it could involve internal relocation within the same nation, such as 
with Arctic indigenous communities.  Second, it could involve transplanting 
climate refugee populations from an island nation to another nation for 
permanent residence in order to avoid the inevitable loss of habitability in their 
homeland due to sea-level rise. 
It is here where Professor Burkett’s proposal faces many additional 
challenges.  By focusing on what happens between “prevention” and “cure” in 
the climate adaptation context, Professor Burkett’s laudable proposal suffers 
from many logistical challenges concerning (1) the limitations of science, (2) the 
challenges of effectively administering the fund, (3) economic shortfalls from 
donor fatigue, and (4) a likely absence of political will to support such a fund. 
Providing compensation for slow-onset events relating to climate change—for 
example, a loss of a fishery or a coral reef system due to ocean acidification—is 
difficult from the perspective of science for at least two reasons.  First, it is 
difficult to determine when a resource is “lost” and eligible for compensation 
under this proposal.  Second, it is also difficult to determine an exclusive 
connection to climate change for that loss. 
Natural resources are resilient and are able to function in an impaired state 
for a long time.  Therefore, it is difficult to determine with precision when a 
resource moves from “impaired” to “lost,” such that it would be eligible for CRC 
compensation.  Slow-onset climate change impacts are not concrete, catastrophic 
events of limited duration, as such events are a much better foundation for a 
compensation fund.  In the climate change context, multiple natural and 
anthropogenic factors are involved in causing ocean acidification, for example.  
Some of these factors are related to climate change (such as increased 
atmospheric carbon dioxide settling into ocean waters), while other factors 
contributing to ocean acidification are unrelated to climate change (such as 
other land-based pollution sources that are discharged directly into waters).  
Regarding the administration of the CRC fund, one challenge is how to 
determine who would administer the payments and what criteria would be 
applied to prioritize them.  The fact that both governments and individuals 
would be eligible to submit claims to the CRC raises a concern regarding 
possible duplication of payments to governments and groups or individuals for 
the same loss.  Perhaps, a better approach would be to appoint an 
ombudsperson for each country through which all CRC claims would need to be 
filed and administered.  Given that many claims would be filed for CRC 
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consideration, extensive guidelines would also need to be in place regarding how 
to prioritize such claims.  The question arises as to whether it would be possible 
to properly prioritize voluminous meritorious claims when the pool of funds is 
finite.  How can one properly decide which claim is more important—the loss of 
a fishery in Jamaica or the loss of a coral reef system in Barbados—where both 
countries have extensive economic, ecosystem, and cultural reliance on such 
resources?  
The economic realities associated with Professor Burkett’s proposal are 
similarly complex and problematic.  The pool of available funding is limited and 
subject to the good will of the developed nations and potential private sector 
sources that would contribute to ensure the continued viability of the fund.  The 
fund could easily face problems of donor fatigue and withdrawal of “buy in” for 
the CRC concept if claims proliferate to the point where maintaining funding 
would pose severe economic hardship for the donors.  In addition, from a moral 
perspective, donors are much more likely to be generous in supporting relocation 
of island nations’ peoples even if it is exceedingly costly, as opposed to being 
“nickeled and dimed” for incremental costs associated with the loss of resources 
on the path toward climate change devastation.   
The UN Compensation Commission (UNCC) as a model for the CRC is well 
intentioned but analytically flawed.  Victims of the Iraq invasion of Kuwait 
suffered tangible losses associated with a catastrophic event of limited duration.  
The UNCC did succeed in providing broad-based relief from losses, including 
environmental damage associated with this conflict.8  Building on the success of 
the UNCC, the BP Oil Spill Fund worked effectively to compensate victims 
because this context also involved a concrete, catastrophic event of limited 
duration.  Harms in these contexts—economic and environmental losses in 
wartime and those associated with an oil spill—were readily identifiable, and 
causation was not an issue. 
Unfortunately, calculating the climate change-related losses for which the 
CRC would be responsible to determine compensation eligibility and amounts is 
a much less precise enterprise than the UNCC and BP Oil Spill Fund.  A better 
approach to avoid the vagaries of calculating these elusive loss assessment 
 
8. See generally Daniel A. Farber, The UNCC as a Model for Climate Compensation, in GULF 
WAR REPARATIONS AND THE UN COMPENSATION COMMISSION: ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY 242 
(Cymie Payne & Peter Sand eds., 2011) (arguing that the UNCC’s recognition of wartime 
impacts on the environment as cognizable under international law may establish a foundation 
for compensation for climate change impacts). Nevertheless, even though the UNCC arguably 
paved the way for compensation for environmental damages beyond those damages related to 
property losses, the leap from losses such as those involved in the UNCC and BP oils spill 
contexts to slow-onset climate loss is simply too ambitious. 
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determinations is two-fold: (1) funding to island nations for climate adaptation, 
and (2) a relocation funding mechanism.  Residents of island nations will only 
relocate once, when their homeland becomes uninhabitable due to grave health 
and safety risks, and there must be a process and funding in place to secure a 
new and safe homeland for the climate displaced.  The international community 
is unlikely to be willing or able to provide funding and political will to support 
more than these two costly investments.  
 
  

